

# From Data to Events: Checking Properties on the Control of a System

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## Abstract

*We present a component-based description language for heterogeneous systems composed of several data flow processing components and a unique event-based controller. Descriptions are used both for generating and deploying implementation code and for checking safety properties on the system. The only constraint is to specify the controller in a synchronous reactive language. We propose an analysis tool which transforms temporal logic properties of the system as a whole into properties on the events of the controller, and hence into synchronous reactive observers. If checks succeed, the final system is therefore correct by construction. When properties cannot be translated exactly into observers of the control, our tool is capable of generating approximate observers. In this case, the results are subject to interpretation, but can prove useful and help detect defects or even guarantee the correctness of a system.*

## 1. Introduction

We describe here a method for the design and code generation of heterogeneous software systems, which allows the specification of *safety properties* on the system and their formal verification. We distinguish two aspects in the design of a heterogeneous system: the data processing operations performed to produce the outputs from the inputs, and the control of the system, which determines the schedule and parameters of the operations. Data processing can be described by data-flow models, whereas control is described by state machines or synchronous languages. Designing control independently from data processing results in a separation of concerns, which allows the formal verification, re-use and independent modification of the parts of the system.

We propose a modular approach, in which data processing is modeled by *processing components* which communicate through data flows, and control is modeled by a unique *control component* whose inputs and outputs are pure events. In this context, an application is described by a network of interconnected components.

For system designers, meaningful properties are *global* properties, that apply to the inputs and outputs of the application itself. We consider only safety properties, a subclass of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae, and we propose an automatic method which translates these properties into properties expressed on the control component. The latter properties can be automatically translated into observers written in the formalism used for describing the control component (namely a synchronous reactive language). In this way, formal methods can be used to check the control component directly: what is proved is what is executed.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of related work, and justifies the choice of a purely event-driven control. Section 3 introduces ADLV, our Architecture Description Language for Verification, which is used for both the description of the application and of the safety properties. Then, we explain how safety properties can be translated, first into *intermediate formulae* (section 4), and finally into *observers* on the control component (section 5). Section 6 gives conclusions and perspectives for future work.

## 2. Related Work and Objectives

Most systems are *hybrid* by nature because they mix continuous behaviors and discrete transitions at some points. For example, when the temperature of an ice cube gradually increases, the laws that determine its physical parameters are locally continuous, but they

change, first when ice turns into liquid water, and second when liquid water evaporates. One can think of this system as a state machine capable of switching between states (solid, liquid, gas) within which a continuous description applies. Differential equations work well when describing each state independently of the others, but to describe the system as a whole, qualitative simulation may prove useful [1]. Qualitative simulation discretizes continuous parameters into regions delimited by *landmark values* and offers a homogeneous discrete framework for simulating hybrid systems. Work on this topic has recently been extended to hybrid automata [2, 3].

Manufactured systems are almost always hybrid systems. Indeed, they often mix traditional continuous automatic control methods with digital supervision that switches the system among a number of different states. This led to the development of *hybrid control*. Hybrid control methods can generally be viewed as hierarchic control, with some transition system at the top level, and continuous control at lower levels [4]. The system thus performs transitions between partitions of the continuous state space where its behavior is purely continuous.

The languages most commonly used in the industry are generally based on discrete transition systems such as state machines. This is the case of Esterel [5], Lustre [6], Signal [7], StateCharts/SyncCharts [8], Grafcet/Sequential Function Chart [9]. However, these languages generally allow operations on numerical values as source of events. For instance, if  $a$  is a numerical input, then one can specify the event  $a < 23$ . This convenience has two drawbacks. First, it mixes “pure” control and data operations inside the controller. Indeed, whereas complex operations such as FFTs are naturally thought of as separate blocks, simpler operations are more likely included in the controller. Second, model checkers can only operate on purely event-based controllers. Thus, one *must* exclude all data operations from the controller in order to use model checking.

As a consequence, our framework clearly distinguishes two parts in a system: (1) an *operative subsystem*, consisting of components that communicate through data flow and possibly events, (2) a control components whose inputs and outputs are only events. This allows formal verification tools to check properties on the control component. However, if these properties were to be specified on controller events, the verification framework would be cumbersome to use. Indeed, the primary vocabulary of the designer consists of the application inputs and outputs, and possibly some internal signals, and cannot be restricted to controller events.

The approach presented here is original in that it permits the specification of properties on the system using natural semantics, for instance “*component C is*

*never active when input E is greater than value V*”. These properties are then translated into the event-based semantics used by the control component, for instance “*event Y is never emitted between an occurrence of X and an occurrence of Z*”, using the description which is also used for generating the implementation. This guarantees the consistency of the transform applied to the safety property and of the way implementation code is generated: this code is *correct by construction*. The verification method thus follows the WYPIWYE (*what you prove is what you execute*) principle [5].

Our purpose is *not* to produce a new formal verification tool, but to design an *analysis tool*, capable of transforming properties expressed on the system as a whole into properties on the control component that can be processed by the verification tools available on the market. In practice, once the properties on the application have been transformed into properties on controller events, they can easily be translated into *observers* [10] written in the target language. In this way, the actual implementation code is checked, so the WYPIWYE paradigm is applied a second time.

### 3. Architecture Description Language for Verification

#### 3.1. Description of Embedded Applications

We introduce here a method for describing of embedded applications as a set of processing components that are activated and connected at the request of a *control component*. This description is used both to generate the actual implementation of the application and to transform properties expressed on the application into properties that can be checked on the control component. We have designed the ADLV language (*Architecture Description Language for Verification*) which has both an abstract syntax and a textual concrete syntax which extends IDL3. This section is an informal introduction to ADLV through the example of a cruise control system depicted on Figure 1. In this diagram, the following symbols are used for input and output ports:



Processing components can either be “black boxes” described in specific formalisms such as Simulink (e.g. the *Regulator* component) or “internal” components directly described in ADLV (e.g. the three leftmost components). In the former case, only the *interface* of the component is described in ADLV, while internal components are completely described in ADLV, and their behavior is known to the ADLV analysis




Figure 1. Component-based cruise control described in ADLV.

and code generation tools. Internal components serve as adaptors between components of heterogeneous nature. For example, the internal component *BrakesCheck* has a boolean data-flow *brakes* input, and produces an event each time the value of *brakes* changes. It produces *brakes\_pushed* when *brakes* goes from *false* to *true*, and *brakes\_released* for the other transition. This leads to the following definition for *BrakesCheck* in ADLV concrete syntax:

```
internal component BrakesCheck {
  sink BrakesOn brakes_on;

  publishes BrakesPushed brakes_pushed {
    when brakes_on;
  }
  publishes BrakesReleased brakes_released {
    when ! brakes_on;
  }
};
```

Likewise, *SpeedCheck* emits a *speed\_ok* event when *current\_speed* enters the range of admissible values for regulation (40..130 km/h), and emits a *speed\_nok* event when it exits this range. Hence the following definition:

```
internal component SpeedCheck {
  sink CurrentSpeed current_speed;

  publishes SpeedCorrect speed_correct {
    when current_speed >= 40
    && current_speed <= 130;
  }
  publishes SpeedIncorrect speed_incorrect {
    when current_speed < 40
    || current_speed > 130;
  }
};
```

There is only one control component per application (here, the *Controller* component, which is written

is Esterel) which is considered as black box which consumes and produces events.

The behavior of the cruise control is as follows: the Simulink component calculates a “regulated command” for the throttle. At startup, the accelerator pedal is connected to the throttle. If the current speed is in the range of admissible values, and the driver presses a “regulation on” button, the output of the *Regulator* component is connected to the throttle. As soon as the driver brakes, the throttle is connected back to the accelerator. To re-enable the cruise control, the driver must both stop braking and press the “regulation on” button. There is therefore a dynamic connection between the throttle and either the “regulated command” from the *Regulator* component or the *accelerator* input. It is depicted as a “switch” on figure 1.

ADLV descriptions can be used to generate the actual implementation of the system. We will not describe these capabilities here, but rather focus on the checking of safety formulae.

## 3.2. Safety Formulae

### 3.2.1. Canonical Safety Formulae

Temporal logic is often used to express properties of reactive systems. In particular, Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is widespread and well understood, especially for the verification of programs [11].

It is often critical to check that some property is “always true” or “never true”. In LTL, for some property *f*, “*f* is always true” is denoted by  $\Box f$ , “*f* is never true” is denoted by  $\Box \neg f$ . If we restrict *f* to the class of *past formulae*,  $\Box f$  is a *canonical safety formula* [12]. Such

formulae offer a good expressive power [13], are simple to use [14, 15] and easy to translate into synchronous reactive languages such as Esterel or Lustre.

In our framework, past formulae are built from classical propositional operators ( $\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \neg$ ), past temporal operators ( $\mathcal{S}$  [since],  $\mathcal{B}$  [back to],  $\Box$  [always],  $\Diamond$  [once],  $\odot$  [previous]), and predicates. The predicates that system designers can use are given in table 1.

Type	Meaning
$s$	true when event $s$ is present
$s \text{ op } k$	true when data flow $s$ satisfies a comparison to constant $k$ . $\text{op}$ is a comparison operator among $\{<, \leq, =, \geq, >\}$
$(\text{in})\text{active}(c)$	true when component $c$ is (in)active
$c_i.p_j \ll c_k.p_\ell$	true when port $p_\ell$ of component $c_k$ is connected to port $p_j$ of component $c_i$
true, false	boolean literals

**Table 1. List of predicates for safety formulae.**

All the predicates can be *negated*, with natural meaning. For instance,  $\neg(s < k) = s \geq k$ ,  $\neg(\text{active}(c)) = \text{inactive}(c)$ , etc. These transformations are *purely syntactic rewrite rules*; there is *no* meaning associated with comparison operators, and signals or values are merely uninterpreted character strings. The signals used in the predicates can belong to at the interface of the application, or be internal signals. Safety formulae are part of the ADLV descriptions, alongside the description of processing components and connections.

### 3.2.2. Example

Let us consider the following property, that must always be satisfied: *when the driver brakes, the regulator is not connected until the driver presses the “regulation on” button and he/she releases the brakes.*

The problem with this specification is that it uses a *future* operator: *until*. However, it can easily be rewritten in the past tense: *since the brakes were pushed, if the driver has not both pressed the “on” button and released the brakes, then the regulator is not connected.* This gives the following ADLV statement (a  $\ll$  b means “output port  $b$  is connected to input port  $a$ ”):

```
always {
  (! (regul_on && !brakes_on)) since brakes_on =>
    !(throttle << regulator.regulated_cmd);
} /* Statement S1 */
```

A statement can use only propositional operators:

```
never {
  set_target &&
    (current_speed < 40 || current_speed > 140);
} /* Statement S2 */
```

The statements  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  will be used as examples in the remainder of this paper. *never* and *always* statements being equivalent, we will only consider *never* statements from this point on, without loss of generality.

### 3.3. Checking the Controller against Safety Formulae

For each safety formula, we must generate an equivalent observer in order to use it to check the controller. However the safety formula can reference signals that are not directly connected to the controller. By analyzing the structure of the application and by looking into the internal blocks, we are able to build an equivalent temporal formula that only references some of the *controller* events. This method is described in section 4.

We are then able (see section 5) to translate this formula (called an *intermediate formula*) into one or two *observers*. These are modules written in the same language as the controller (for instance, Esterel or Lustre). One can then use language-specific *checking tools* in order to *prove* that the safety properties are satisfied by the controller.


The steps towards the generation of the observer are summarized on figure 2.

The properties are checked on the synchronous implementation of the controller, which is destined to drive the application at run time, thanks to observers directly generated from the application description itself. As stated above, the WYPIWYE is effectively applied in two respects.

## 4. Interpretation of Temporal Formulae

### 4.1. Overview

For each formulae in a never statements, the general idea is to compute a signal in the synchronous language, which is emitted at each instant when the formula is satisfied. A special signal *failure* is emitted when the top-level formula of a never statement is satisfied. Model-checking tools will either prove that *failure* can never be emitted, or exhibit a counterexample.



**Figure 2. Overview of property verification.**

The problem is stated as follows: *Given  $f$  a temporal logic formula involving application signals, build a corresponding signal  $s$ , based uniquely on the controller’s input and output events, using constructs of the controller implementation language.* We can decompose this problem into two sub-problems:

1. transform predicates involving application signals into predicates involving controller events only. This section studies this sub-problem, which represents the major part of our work,
2. generate an observer in the target language, from a temporal logic formula. This has been proved to be relatively easy [14, 15]. More details regarding our own framework are given in section 5.

The first issue boils down to translating predicates:

- *event* predicates must be transformed into controller event predicates, what can be achieved by following the connections,
- *comparisons* involving data flow values. The data flows are generally inputs of internal components that emit events when the comparison becomes true or false. Such a predicate is therefore true between the occurrences of a “start” and a “stop” event,
- *activations* and *connections* are either performed at startup, or modified at runtime by internal components. Once again, we can identify “start” and “stop” events for the validity of the predicate.

To define truth values that are true between the occurrences of two events, we introduce *interval predicates*, denoted by  $[u, v[$ .  $[u, v[$  is true if  $u$  has occurred, but  $v$  has not occurred yet. Note that the truth value of an event predicate  $s$  is that of the interval predicate  $[s, \bar{s}[$ . This way, solving sub-problem #1 amounts to replacing any predicate in the *original formula* with interval predicates involving controller events only. This yields a new temporal logic formula which is called an *intermediate formula*. Both types of formulae share the same propositional and temporal operators; they differ by the types of acceptable predicates: those of table 1 for original formulae, intervals for intermediate formulae.

However, it is not always possible to find an intermediate formula that is *strictly equivalent* to the original formula. Nevertheless, it is sometimes possible to approximate the original formula by two intermediate formulae, one too strict, one too loose, as will be seen in section 4.3. More precisely, when a formula cannot be translated into an interval, but can be “bracketed” by two intervals, the analysis algorithm creates a *proto-interval* that consists of the pair of bracketing intervals.

As a result, the most general algorithm doesn’t directly produce intermediate formulae built from intervals, but rather formulae built from proto-intervals, that are called *proto-intermediate formulae*.

In cases where it is possible to produce an intermediate formula equivalent to the original formula, proto-intermediate formulae are simply equal to the intermediate formulae. Otherwise, proto-intermediate formulae are the best approximations for the original formula. More details are given in section 4.4, including an algorithm to produce one or two intermediate formulae from a proto-intermediate formula. In this case, we call these *approximate* intermediate formulae, in contrast to otherwise *exact* intermediate formulae. Table 2 gives the definitions for interval and proto-interval predicates.

Type	Meaning
$[s_i, s_j[$	true when event $s_i$ has occurred, but event $s_j$ has not yet occurred
$(A_I, A_O)$	approximation of the truth value of a formula by too strict an interval ( $A_I$ , inner) and too loose an interval ( $A_O$ , outer)

**Table 2. Predicates for internal use.**

## 4.2. Building Proto-Intermediate Formulae

The algorithm for translating an original formula to a proto-intermediate formula is based on the following *pif* (“proto-intermediate formula”) function.  $pif(f)$ :

1. if  $f$  is of type **(in) active**( $c$ ), look for activation conditions of component  $c$ . These conditions are events produced by the controller and processed by an internal component. Return an interval, whose bounds are the controller events that activate and deactivate component  $c$ .
2. if  $f$  a connection predicate, proceed as above: look for controller events that are processed by internal components to connect ports, and return an interval whose bounds are the controller events that cause the connection and disconnection.
3. if  $f$  is of type *signal* ( $s$ ),  $s$  may either be one of the controller ports (let  $p = s$ ), or  $s$  may be connected to such a port  $p$ . If  $p$  is found, return  $[p, \bar{p}[$ .
4. then, look for  $f$  and  $\neg f$  in the *when* clause of a *publishes ... when ...* statement<sup>1</sup> of an internal component. If the corresponding internal ports are connected to the controller, let  $p_f$  and  $p_{\neg f}$  be the controller’s ports. Then, return  $[p_f, p_{\neg f}[$ . If only an

<sup>1</sup>Identification of formulae can be achieved by using a canonical form, derived from a *normal form*.

approximate result is found, store it in the *approx* variable, and proceed to the next step.

5. if  $f$  is of type  $a \star b$  where  $\star$  is a binary operator, let  $a' = \text{pif}(a)$  and  $b' = \text{pif}(b)$ . If  $a'$  and  $b'$  are defined and are exact intermediate formulae for  $a$  and  $b$ , return  $a' \star b'$ . Else, if *approx* is defined, return *approx*. If *approx* is not defined, return  $a' \star b'$ .
6. if  $f$  is of type  $\star a$  where  $\star$  is a unary operator, let  $a' = \text{pif}(a)$ . As above, return  $\star a'$  or *approx*.
7. if nothing has been returned so far, *pif* fails.

**Remark 1** Proto-intermediate formulae only appear when looking for  $f$  in *when* clauses (step 4). If this happens, we do not return the intermediate formula right away, but rather try to privilege an exact formula possibly found by decomposing  $f$  (steps 5 and 6). We return an approximate solution only as a last resort.

**Remark 2** In steps 5 and 6, formulae are decomposed following the tree structure resulting from the way they were written by the user. We do not consider reorganizing the formulae because: 1) it limits the complexity of the algorithm, 2) it takes advantage of the common patterns in safety formulae and when clauses which are written by the *same* person<sup>2</sup>.

**Example** The predicates of statement  $S_1$  can be found directly in *when* clauses, and translated into intervals:

- a look at the textual description of component *BrakesCheck* shows that `brakes_on` corresponds to `[brakes_pushed,brakes_released]`,
- `regul_on` is directly a controller input event, so it corresponds to `[regul_on,regul_on]`,
- `throttle << regulator.regulated_cmd` corresponds to `[start_reg,stop_reg]` (the dynamic connection on the right of figure 1 is treated as an internal component).

This yields  $IF_1$ , an *exact* intermediate form:

$$\neg\{(\neg([\text{regul\_on}, \overline{\text{regul\_on}}] \wedge [\text{brakes\_released}, \text{brakes\_pushed}])) \\ \mathcal{S} [\text{brakes\_pushed}, \text{brakes\_released}] \Rightarrow \neg[\text{start\_reg}, \text{stop\_reg}]\}$$

<sup>2</sup>This is similar to what is done in *Global Common Subexpression Elimination* (GCSE) in compiler theory [16, 17]: subexpressions are identified, but the structure is not reorganized.




Figure 3. Hasse diagram, with sets  $S_I^+$  &  $S_O^+$ .




Figure 4. "Bracketing" of  $I$ .

### 4.3. General Case: Dealing With *when* Clauses

This section deals with the matching of an original formula  $f$  in *when* clauses. The match may be exact as in the example above, but this section gives details about how approximate matches are found.

Let  $f$  be an original formula, and let us suppose that there are a number of *publishes... when...* statements, of the form *publishes*  $s_i$  *when*  $a_i$ . The goal is to find an interval  $I$  equivalent to  $f$ , i.e. a *start signal*, after which  $f$  becomes true, and a *stop signal*, at which  $f$  becomes false. To determine the start signal, we look for signals  $s_i$  in *when* statements where  $a_i = f$ ,  $a_i \Rightarrow f$ , or  $f \Rightarrow a_i$ <sup>3</sup>. The same applies to the stop signal, with  $f$  being replaced with  $\neg f$ . From now on, we only consider the start signal; finding the stop signal is similar.

Each formula  $a_i$  is associated to a signal  $s_i$  (which is emitted when  $a_i$  becomes true). Let's call  $I^+$  and  $I^-$  the start and stop signals of  $f$  ( $I = [I^+, I^-]$ ).

There is a partial order relation ( $\cdot \Leftarrow \cdot$ ) on the set of formulae, and an associated equivalence relation ( $\cdot = \cdot$ ). By structure morphism, these relations respectively induce a partial order relation  $\cdot \preceq \cdot$  and an equivalence relation  $\cdot \leftrightarrow \cdot$  on the set of signals.  $a \Leftarrow b$  means that  $a$  must be satisfied for  $b$  to be satisfied ( $b \Rightarrow a$ ). This means that the event  $s_b$  associated to  $b$  *cannot happen before*  $s_a$  the event associated to  $a$ . Therefore,  $s_b$  *must* happen after  $s_a$ . The  $\preceq$  relation is therefore a temporal order on the occurrence of signals.  $s_a \preceq s_b$  means that  $s_a$  is always emitted before  $s_b$ . Likewise,  $\leftrightarrow$  corresponds to the simultaneity of signals. As a consequence, it is possible to build a *Hasse diagram* involving  $I^+$  and the signals  $s_i$  that compare to  $I^+$  (see figure 3).

<sup>3</sup>Determining the implication relationships is straightforward using the aforementioned *canonical forms*.

Among the signals that happen “before”  $I^+$ , only the maximum ones, the “closest to  $I^+$ ” matter. On the example, these are  $s_1$  and  $s_4$ . These signals provide the *best possible approximation of  $I^+$ , while preceding it*. Let  $S_O^+$  be the set of these signals. Formally, it is defined as:  $S_O^+ = \{s \in \mathbb{S} \mid s \preceq I^+ \wedge \neg(\exists s' \in \mathbb{S}, s \preceq s' \preceq I^+)\}$ . Likewise, let  $S_I^+$  be the set of *minimum* elements located after  $I^+$ ,  $S_I^-$  the set of *maximum* elements located before  $I^-$ , and  $S_O^-$  the set of *minimum* elements located after  $I^-$ .  $S_I^+, S_O^+, S_I^-$  and  $S_O^-$  are depicted on figure 3.

Let us define  $s_O^+ \in S_O^+, s_I^+ \in S_I^+, s_I^- \in S_I^-$  and  $s_O^- \in S_O^-$ . Relative positions of this signals is shown on figure 4. This provides us with a “bracketing” of  $I$ : an outer approximate,  $[s_O^+, s_O^-]$ , and an inner approximate,  $[s_I^+, s_I^-]$ . This “bracketing” is valid whatever the signals  $s_O^+, s_I^+, s_I^-$  and  $s_O^-$ :

$$\begin{cases} s_O^+ & \preceq & I^+ & \preceq & s_I^+ \\ s_I^- & \preceq & I^- & \preceq & s_O^- \end{cases}$$

We wish to define the *best possible approximation* for  $I^+$  and  $I^-$ . Hence, within leftmost members, we consider the *last* signal to occur, and within rightmost members, we consider the *first* signal to occur. This enables us to define intervals  $A_I$  (best inner approximation) and  $A_O$  (best outer approximation):

$$\underbrace{[\text{first}(S_I^+), \text{last}(S_I^-)]}_{A_I} \subset I \subset \underbrace{[\text{last}(S_O^+), \text{first}(S_O^-)]}_{A_O}$$

This finishes the complete description of the step #4 in the algorithm of section 4.2:

- if there exist signals  $s^+$  and  $s^-$  such that  $s^+ \leftrightarrow I^+$  and  $s^- \leftrightarrow I^-$ , then return the interval  $[s^+, s^-]$ ,
- else, try to define intervals  $A_I$  and/or  $A_O$ . Return the pair  $(A_I, A_O)$ , which is called a *proto-interval*,
- else, go to step #5.

## 4.4. Proto-Intermediate Formulae

### 4.4.1. Definitions

A *proto-interval* is a pair  $(A_I, A_O)$  of intervals that constitutes a “bracketing” of the interval  $I$  corresponding to a formula  $f$ . If  $A_I = A_O$ , it means that  $I = A_I = A_O$  and this is an *exact match* (the set of intervals is trivially embedded into the set of proto-intervals). From now on we will assume that  $A_I \neq A_O$ . A *proto-intermediate formula* is a formula whose predicates are proto-intervals.




Figure 5. Structure of the intermediate formulae for proto-intermediate formula  $g' = \neg f'$ .

**Example** In statement  $S_2$ , the expression

$e = \text{current\_speed} < 40 \parallel \text{current\_speed} > 140$

cannot be found *exactly*. However, if we examine the *when* clauses of component *SpeedCheck*, we see that:

1)  $I_e^+ \Rightarrow \text{speed\_incorrect}$ , and 2)  $\text{speed\_correct} \Rightarrow I_e^-$ .

The interval  $[\text{speed\_incorrect}, \text{speed\_correct}]$  is thus an *outer* interval for  $e$ . There is no inner interval for  $e$ , so the proto-intermediate formula for  $S_2$  is

$PIF_2 = \text{set\_target} \wedge (\emptyset, [\text{speed\_incorrect}, \text{speed\_correct}])$

Intermediate formulae can easily be translated into observers (see section 5). A proto-interval, as a pair of intervals, is thus a pair of intermediate formulae and can therefore be translated into *two* observers: one too loose, one too strict. However, a non-trivial proto-intermediate formula cannot directly be used as such and needs to be *rewritten into a pair of intermediate formulae*.

### 4.4.2. Transforming Proto-Intermediate Formulae into Pairs of Intermediate Formulae

A proto-intermediate formula  $f'$  is rewritten as  $(f'_I, f'_O)$ , where  $f'_I$  is an inner (“strict”) intermediate formula, and  $f'_O$  is an outer (“loose”) intermediate formula. We denote this by  $f' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I, f'_O)$ . Thus for a proto-interval, we have the trivial rule:  $(A_I, A_O) \rightsquigarrow (A_I, A_O)$ .

**Methodology used for the proofs** Suppose that an original formula  $f$  has a proto-intermediate formula  $f'$  which is rewritten as  $(f'_I, f'_O)$ . Then the order relations on the start and stop events give:

$$\begin{cases} f'_O & \Leftarrow & f & \Leftarrow & f'_I & \text{(start event)} \\ \neg f'_I & \Leftarrow & \neg f & \Leftarrow & \neg f'_O & \text{(stop event)} \end{cases}$$

Both relations are equivalent, so we can retain only the first one. Conversely, let  $f$  be an original formula. If there are intermediate formulae  $g$  and  $h$  such that  $g \Leftarrow f \Leftarrow h$ , then  $g$  and  $h$  are respectively inner and outer intermediate formulae for  $f$ . In short,  $f' \rightsquigarrow (g, h)$ .

**Negation** Let  $f'$  be a proto-intermediate formula, associated to an original formula  $f$ , with  $f' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I, f'_O)$ . Let  $g' = \neg f'$ . The situation is depicted on figure 5.

Formally, one can write  $f'_I \Leftarrow f \Leftarrow f'_O$ . By taking the contraposition:  $\neg f'_O \Leftarrow \neg f \Leftarrow \neg f'_I$ . Hence the conclusion, that shows that the negation *inverts* the inner and outer formulae:

$$\text{if } f' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I, f'_O) \text{ then } \neg f' \rightsquigarrow (\neg f'_O, \neg f'_I)$$

**Conjunction, disjunction and implication** Let  $f'$  and  $g'$  be two proto-intermediate formulae, respectively associated with original formulae  $f$  and  $g$ . Let us suppose that  $f' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I, f'_O)$  et  $g' \rightsquigarrow (g'_I, g'_O)$ .

We have:  $f'_I \Leftarrow f \Leftarrow f'_O$  and  $g'_I \Leftarrow g \Leftarrow g'_O$ . The relation  $\Leftarrow$  is *compatible* with logical and<sup>4</sup>, thus we have:

$$f'_I \wedge g'_I \Leftarrow f \wedge g \Leftarrow f'_O \wedge g'_O$$

Finally:  $f' \wedge g' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I \wedge g'_I, f'_O \wedge g'_O)$ . Likewise,  $\Leftarrow$  is compatible with  $\vee$ , thus  $f' \vee g' \rightsquigarrow (f'_I \vee g'_I, f'_O \vee g'_O)$ .

Implication is dealt with by rewriting  $f' \rightarrow g'$  as  $\neg f' \vee g'$ . By applying rules seen above:

$$f' \rightarrow g' \rightsquigarrow (f'_O \rightarrow g'_I, f'_I \rightarrow g'_O)$$

**Temporal operators** We still are under the assumption that  $f'_I \Leftarrow f \Leftarrow f'_O$  and  $g'_I \Leftarrow g \Leftarrow g'_O$ .

Let  $\Psi$  be a unary temporal operator. Manna et al [18] state that temporal operators are monotonic, hence the relation:  $\Psi(f'_I) \Leftarrow \Psi(f) \Leftarrow \Psi(f'_O)$ . We thus conclude:  $\Psi(f') \rightsquigarrow (\Psi(f'_I), \Psi(f'_O))$ .

The same applies to binary temporal operators. If  $\Psi$  is a binary temporal operator, we have likewise:  $\Psi(f', g') \rightsquigarrow (\Psi(f'_I, g'_I), \Psi(f'_O, g'_O))$ .

**Conclusion** Apart from negation and implication, almost all operators permit a “natural” transformation of proto-intermediate formulae into pairs of intermediate formulae. When doing so, there are two cases:

1. the proto-intermediate formula contains *exact* proto-intervals only. In this case, we finally get only one intermediate formula, which is *exact* too,
2. the proto-intermediate formula contains at least an *approximate* proto-interval. In this case, we finally get one inner and/or one outer intermediate formula(e).

**Example** The proto-intermediate formula  $PIF_2$  is naturally rewritten as only an outer intermediate formula  $IF_2 = \text{set\_target} \wedge [\text{speed\_incorrect}, \text{speed\_correct}]$ .

<sup>4</sup>The formula  $[(a \rightarrow b) \wedge (c \rightarrow d)] \rightarrow [(a \wedge c) \rightarrow (b \wedge d)]$  is a tautology, which can easily be verified.

## 5. From Intermediate Formulae to Observers

### 5.1. Observers and Use Thereof

As stated above, an intermediate formula is a logic formula that must never be true. Therefore, we have to translate it into an *observer* in the target language. The observer emits an error signal in the states where the formula is true. One can then use a *verification tool* either to *prove* that the error signal is never emitted (and hence that the safety properties are satisfied), or conversely, to exhibit a *counterexample*. The verification tool is generally provided with the target development environment; examples include *checkblif* for Esterel and *lesar* for Lustre.

When the analysis of safety formulae produces *exact* observers, the results of the checking tools directly correspond to the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the formulae. However, when the analysis produces *approximate* observers, the results are subject to interpretation, and the analysis tool must state it clearly.

Indeed, an observer based on an inner intermediate formula can miss some failure cases because it is *too loose*. However, if the checking tool finds a counterexample, it really corresponds to a case of non-satisfaction of the safety formulae. The checking toolchain thus performs an *under-verification* of the system.

Conversely, an observer based on an outer intermediate formula doesn't miss any real failure case, but it is prone to detecting *false positives*, because it is *too strict*. The checking toolchain thus performs an *over-verification* of the system.

**Example** An observer based on  $IF_2$  is too strict compared to the statement  $S_2$ . This statement ensures that the event `set_target` never occurs when the speed is below 40 or above 140 km/h. However, an observer based on  $IF_2$  will ensure that `set_target` never occurs when the speed is below 40 or above 130 km/h. Thus it may detect “counterexamples” for speeds in the interval 130-140 km/h that are not contradictory with the safety property  $S_2$ .

### 5.2. Esterel Observers

Esterel is a synchronous reactive language with a significant user base in the industry, especially for designing safety-critical systems.

It is quite straightforward to associate an Esterel module to every sub-formula  $f$  of an intermediate formula. This module emits a signal  $\mathcal{S}_f$  whenever  $f$  is true. Let us see a few examples of such modules.



A simple interval  $I = [s_1, s_2[$  can be translated as follows as a module which maintains an output signal  $\mathcal{S}_I$  between the occurrences of signals  $s_1$  and  $s_2$ :

```
every immediate s1 do
  abort
  sustain S_I
when s2
end every
```

The implementation for more complex intervals involving first and last operators is slightly more complicated.

For a propositional operator, say  $e = a \wedge b$ , we first generate the modules corresponding to  $a$  and  $b$ , respectively  $c_a$  (output signal  $\mathcal{S}_a$ ) and  $c_b$  (output signal  $\mathcal{S}_b$ ). Then the module for the *and* operator is straightforwardly:

```
run c_a || run c_b ||
[
  every immediate [S_a and S_b] do
    emit S_e
  end every
]
```

Modules for temporal operators are implemented in the same way. Examples can be found in other papers [15]. For instance,  $e = a \mathcal{S} b$  is translated as:

```
run c_a || run c_b ||
[
  every immediate S_b do
    do
      sustain S_e
      watching immediate [not S_a]
    end every
]
```

There is also a top-level module, responsible for collecting the signals associated with every individual intermediate formula, and generating the *failure* signal when necessary.

The program containing the observers is compiled alongside the controller code, and then Esterel's standard *checkblif* tool is used to perform the verification.

### 5.3. Lustre Observers

Regarding its expressive power and use, Lustre is close to Esterel. However, while Esterel is based on modules, Lustre is based on *nodes* which can be thought of as reusable *functions*.

A very practical option is to build a library of nodes, corresponding to each of the propositional and temporal operators [19]. For instance, the following nodes calculates  $b \mathcal{S} a$ :

```
node since(B, A: bool) returns (B_since_A: bool);
let
  B_since_A =
    if A then B
    else if B then true
    else (true -> pre(B_since_A));
tel
```

It is thus possible to build *Lustre expressions* directly corresponding to intermediate formulae. For instance, the intermediate formula  $IF_1$  is translated to:

```
never_3 = not (
  implies(since(not (
    interval(regul_on, not(regul_on))
  and
    interval(brakes_released, brakes_pushed)
  ), interval(brakes_pushed, brakes_released)),
  not(interval(start_reg, stop_reg))));
```

A top-level node emits an output signal *ok* to indicate whether or not all formulae are satisfied. This is used by the standard Lustre verifier called *lesar*.

## 6. Conclusions and Perspectives

The analysis method presented here allows the designer to express properties on a system in a natural way, using temporal logic to specify relations among internal or external signals. These properties can then be automatically translated into temporal logic properties on the controller events. From this, observers can be generated in the language used for specifying the controller, and used to prove the properties by model-checking.

In cases in which specified properties do not exactly match controller events, approximate observers can be generated. Although their results are subject to interpretation, they can help system designers detect certain defects and validate part of the behavior of their systems.

We have implemented the analysis tool in Java. This tool reads a textual ADLV description of an application, analyses the safety formulae and the behavior of the internal components, and builds proto-intermediate formulae and intermediate formulae. It can then produce observers for the controller in various languages thanks to a modular structure which requires the definition of just one class for each supported language. This class implements a visitor pattern [20] that traverses intermediate formulae and generates programs in the target language. We provide visitors for Esterel and Lustre, but support for other languages can be added very easily. The tool is available at <http://wwwdi.supelec.fr/logiciels/adlv/>.

Perspectives include handling a wider range of system descriptions. For instance, the current method cannot deal with the cases in which connections between processing components and the controller change at runtime. This extension makes the analysis more complex since the mapping between formulae and controller signals becomes dynamical.

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